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Priming of reach trajectory when observing actions:
Hand-centred effects
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When another person’s actions are observed it appears that these actions are simulated, such that
similar motor processes are triggered in the observer. Much evidence suggests that such simulation
concerns the achievement of behavioural goals, such as grasping a particular object, and is less con-
cerned with the speciﬁc nature of the action, such as the path the hand takes to reach the goal
object. We demonstrate that when observing another person reach around an obstacle, an observer’s
subsequent reach has an increased curved trajectory, reﬂecting motor priming of reach path. This
priming of reach trajectory via action observation can take place under a variety of circumstances:
with or without a shared goal, and when the action is seen from a variety of perspectives.
However, of most importance, the reach path priming effect is only evoked if the obstacle avoided
by another person is within the action (peripersonal) space of the observer.
Keywords: Mirror neurons; Peripersonal space; Reaching; Obstacle avoidance; Action priming.
For more than a decade there has been a substan-
tial amount of research investigating how the
actions of other individuals are encoded. A key
idea is that one means of understanding the behav-
iour of others is by simulating their actions. Thus,
the motor representations that would be activated
when undertaking a task are active when one is
merely observing another person undertake the
same action. Perhaps the key to motivating this
research approach was the discovery of mirror
cells. These were neurons in ventral premotor
region F5 in the macaque that responded when
the monkey grasped an object, but also responded
in a similar way when the same action was
observed (e.g., di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi,
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). Later research has
also found neurons with mirror properties in the
inferior parietal lobe (IPL) of monkeys (Fogassi,
Gallese, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1998; Fogassi
et al., 2005).
After the initial discovery of mirror systems via
single unit recording in the monkey, subsequent
work has revealed similar systems in humans. Via
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
regions around the dorsal and ventral premotor
cortices and in the inferior parietal lobe have been
identiﬁed that become active when observing
another person’s behaviour (e.g., Binkofski et al.,
1999; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers,
2007; Iacoboni et al., 1999). Furthermore,
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predicts that one’s own actions are primed by this
activation. Indeed, observing an action such as
grasping an object facilitates the production of
the same action shortly afterwards (e.g., Castiello,
Lusher, Mari, Edwards, & Humphreys, 2002;
Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta `,1 9 9 8 ;
Edwards, Humphreys, & Castiello, 2003).
Similarly, Bach and Tipper (2007) showed that
when actions such as kicking a soccer ball or
typing are observed, subsequent foot and hand
responses, respectively, were facilitated.
A key issue is what form of information is
encoded when another individual’s actions are
observed. It is clear that there are two components
to prehensile actions: reach and grasp. These
appear to be encoded by different neural systems
(e.g., Jeannerod, 1988). It might be the case that
both of these motor processes are simulated, such
that the path the hand takes to reach an object
and the highly speciﬁc patterns of the ﬁnger move-
ments as they shape to grasp the target are
reﬂected in neural responses. However, in single-
cell studies of mirror systems sensitive to the
form of grasp, the speciﬁc reach path as the hand
approaches an object has not been reported as
critical to neural activity (e.g., Fogassi et al.,
2001; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, &
Sakata, 2000). It is therefore possible that the
mirror-like system’s primary role is to understand
the goal of the action (pick up a glass), with little
concern for the speciﬁc way the goal was achieved
(how the hand reached the glass; van Elk, van
Schie, & Bekkering, 2008).
There is clear evidence to support the idea that
the action simulation processes are concerned with
encoding the behavioural goal, rather than the
low-level speciﬁc reach properties of the action:
When observing a reach, some parietal cells
respond selectively when the ﬁnal grasp is for
eating but not when it is for placing (Fogassi
et al., 2005; and in humans, Iacoboni et al.,
2005). In fact the action goal, such as pressing
down on an object, can produce facilitation
priming effects when repeated, even if the
observed and subsequently produced action is
undertaken by a different effector (e.g., hand
then foot; Costantini, Committeri & Galati,
2008). Similarly, the discovery of acoustic mirror
neurons that respond to the sound of an action
that cannot be seen (Kohler et al., 2002) and
cells that respond when action cannot be directly
observed when grasping an object behind an occlu-
der (Umilta ` et al., 2001), also suggest that the
mirror system may code actions at an abstract
level in terms of the goal to be achieved rather
than the speciﬁc form of the action (e.g., Gallese
& Lakoff, 2005). Similarly, in human participants,
Castiello (2003) showed that the motor system of
a participant can be primed when no action is
directly viewed. That is, observing another
person looking towards target and distractor
objects activates the intention to act, which in
turn stimulates similar motor representations in
the observer. That actions can be primed when
no action is observed is a strong demonstration
that motor simulation is driven by abstract goals
and that the speciﬁc properties of an action, such
as reach trajectory, are not necessary for action
priming (see also Bach & Tipper, 2006).
In the current study we attempt to ﬁnd evidence
that not only is the goal of an action encoded via
grasp information, but in fact in some circum-
stances more speciﬁc properties of action, such as
reach trajectory, are also encoded (see also
Hamilton & Grafton, 2006). Clearly prehensile
actions directed towards objects require these
two reach and grasp processes, and we believe
that in some situations the reach, as well as
action goal of grasp, is simulated. For example,
consider the task of reaching around an obstacle
to grasp a target object. In this situation we
hypothesize that the reach component is now
relevant to understanding the other person’s
behaviour and hence will be simulated. Therefore,
although grasp- and goal-related simulation has
been detected thus far, the key component of how
the hand reaches to a target should also be simu-
lated in some situations for a full understanding
of another person’s behaviour.
To investigate whether the reach of another
person can be implicitly simulated we employed
priming methods. As noted above, a large
number of studies have investigated how the
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PERIPERSONAL REACH PATH SIMULATIONimplicit encoding of observed, goal-orientated,
grasping actions affects subsequent action by the
observer (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001;
Craighero et al., 1998; Stu ¨rmer, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2000). Other studies have focused on
related issues—that is, situations where actions
have to be directed to target objects in the presence
of distractors. For example, Tipper, Lortie, and
Baylis (1992) and Tipper, Howard, and Jackson
(1997) demonstrated action-centred selection pro-
cesses in a selective reaching task. That is, when a
person was reaching for a target, distractors closer
to the hand produced signiﬁcant interference and
were associated with inhibition, as revealed by
curved trajectories and subsequently slowed
responses (i.e., negative priming effects). Thus,
selective action directed towards a target was
achieved in part by inhibition of the competing
distractor, and in other studies (e.g., Schuch &
Tipper, 2007) we have provided some evidence
that another person’s inhibition of an action can
be simulated by an observer (see also Frischen,
Loach, & Tipper, 2009).
In the current work, to investigate simulation of
selective reaching, we utilized the methods devel-
oped by Jax and Rosenbaum (2007). They reported
that, after avoidance of an obstacle, subsequent
reaches to targets when there was no obstacle
present showed curved trajectories. That is, prior
obstacle avoidance primed the motor system such
that those representations were accessed for sub-
sequent reaches, resulting in curved trajectories
when a straight reach was more appropriate.
Therefore the obstacle avoidance priming effect
would seem to be an ideal technique to examine
whetherthe processesinvolved—thatis,the avoid-
ance reach path—are simulated. We adopted the
methods of Jax and Rosenbaum because they
produce robust effects and because the avoidance
of an obstacle is a salient property of another
person’s reach trajectory, and hence it is a suitable
approach to examine whether the obstacle avoid-
ance priming effects generalize between people.
A series of experiments are reported. As a
preview, in a new procedure we replicate the
basic effects reported by Jax and Rosenbaum
(2007) where a reach is more curved when a
previous reach by the same person avoided an
obstacle. In a further two experiments, when two
people undertook alternate trials we did not ﬁnd
any evidence for the obstacle avoidance of one
individual affecting the reach trajectory of a
second person on the next trial. Although this
suggested that obstacle avoidance is not simulated,
we noted that in these experiments the obstacle
avoided was outside the peripersonal space of the
observer. In previous research investigating
response to targets in the presence of distractors,
effects appeared to be inﬂuenced by the distance
between the distractor object and responding
hand (e.g., Howard & Tipper, 1997; Meegan &
Tipper, 1999; Tipper et al., 1992). Indeed, a sub-
sequent study showed that when the observed
obstacle was within a viewer’s peripersonal action
space, another person’s reach path was simulated
and inﬂuenced the observer’s subsequent reach tra-
jectory. In ﬁnal studies we show that these periper-
sonal reach simulation/priming effects generalize
to situations where two people are in a variety of
different spatial positions relative to one another,
whether they respond to the same target object,
avoid the same distractor obstacle, or even when
they respond to completely separate targets and
obstacles in different tasks. A ﬁnal study employ-
ing a transparent barrier between an observer and
another person’s reach conﬁrmed the effect when
the obstacle was within the peripersonal space of
the viewer.
EXPERIMENT 1: SINGLE PERSON
REACHING
In this initial experiment we sought to replicate
the carry-over effect found by Jax and
Rosenbaum (2007) and to establish whether this
approach, placed into a real-world setting, would
provide a methodology that could be used to inves-
tigate between-person effects. Note that in Jax
and Rosenbaum’s work, targets and distractors
were presented on a computer screen, and
reaches were made by moving a pen across a
graphics tablet oriented 908 to the display and in
a different spatial location. In sharp contrast, our
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GRIFFITHS AND TIPPERcurrent experiment requires participants to reach
for and lift up target blocks directly in front of
them. When an obstacle was present they were




A total of 24 right-handed students (20 female),
with a mean age of 20.3 years, participated in
this study in return for course credits. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Participants gave informed consent, and the
study received the approval of the School of
Psychology’s ethics committee.
Materials and apparatus
Each participant had a retro reﬂective marker
placed on their right wrist. Participants’ movements
were tracked using a Qualisys ProReﬂex motion
capturing system (Qualisys AB, Gothenburg,
Sweden), and the data were recorded using
Qualisys Track Manager (QTM) software
(Qualisys AB). The target object to be reached for
was 3   2 cm, and it was 9 cm high. The obstacle
to be avoided was 4.5   4.5 cm, and it was 18 cm
high. These materials and apparatus were constant
throughout the series of experiments.
Procedure and design
Participants sat at a desk with the chair adjusted so
that the arm to be used to reach to the target rested
comfortably on the desk with the forearm at right
angles to the upper arm and the hand approxi-
mately 20 cm from the trunk. The far edge of
the target block (which participants have to
reach to in order to grasp) was 40 cm from the
starting position of the participant’s reaching
hand. This distance was selected as a comfortable
reach distance, which was nevertheless close to
the full extent of reach. The near edge of the
obstacle, when present, was 20 cm directly ahead
of the hand. The distances of the participant’s
target and obstacle blocks remained constant
throughout all the experiments reported here.
The experimenter sat directly in front of the
participant. The obstacle, when not in place, was
kept out of view. See Figure 1 for details.
The experiment sought to investigate the effect
of n-1 and n-2 trials on the current trial n.T h e
order of obstacle presentation was therefore coun-
terbalanced for n-1 and n-2 trials. Trials could be
with or without an obstacle; counterbalancing for
the current and previous two trials gave eight poss-
ible trial orders. Each of these occurred 10 times
for the participant, in random order; two
additional trials that were not further analysed
were added to the start of the experiment to
provide an n-2 condition history for the ﬁrst
trials of relevance.
Participants carried out 10 practice reaches.
They were instructed to close their eyes at the
end of a reach, opening them again on the instruc-
tion to initiate movement. This ensured that par-
ticipants did not observe the experimenter’s arm
movements. They were instructed to reach out,
lift up, and place the target block back down
again in the same spot. If the obstacle was
present they were instructed to reach over the
obstacle in the vertical plane.
Results
For each trial we measured the maximum height
reached on the outward movement. Unlike Jax
and Rosenbaum’s (2007) work we considered and
compared only the n trials without an obstacle.
With the use of real-world stimuli we found that
participants were careful to avoid knocking over
the obstacle and thus cleared the obstacle block
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Single person reaching. This diagram
demonstrates an example series of reaches, where the same person
performs on every trial. n-1 is the trial that preceded the current
trial. n-2 is the last but one trial. Black square is the target;
white square is the obstacle. This example shows an O–No–No
trial sequence.
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PERIPERSONAL REACH PATH SIMULATIONwith great care. This meant that during reaches
over an obstacle there was very little variation in
height between the trials; the obstacle trials had
signiﬁcantly smaller standard deviations than the
non-obstacle trials [F(1, 13) ¼ 41.05, p , .001].
Due to this lack of variability we observed no
effects of the presence or absence of an obstacle
in previous trials (n-2 and n-1) when analysing
reach path on the critical trial (n). Therefore we
do not discuss data from obstacle avoidance trials
in the rest of the paper (though they are shown
in the Appendix); rather we only discuss effects
of prior trials on reaches where no obstacle was
presented on trial n.
For the analysed trials where no obstacle was
present in trial n there were four conditions
(No ¼ no obstacle, and O ¼ obstacle):
1. n-2 ¼ No n-1 ¼ No n ¼ No
2. n-2 ¼ O n-1 ¼ No n ¼ No
3. n-2 ¼ No n-1 ¼ O n ¼ No
4. n-2 ¼ O n-1 ¼ O n ¼ No
We excluded a number of trials where the partici-
pant knocked over one of the blocks, and the two
trials that followed such errors were removed
(2.08% of trials). We have also excluded a
number of trials where part of the trajectory was
not properly tracked by the equipment.
Figure 2 represents the results. The heights were
analysed using a two-way within-subjects analysis
of variance (ANOVA), with two factors: n-1 trial
type (with or without obstacle) and n-2 trial type.
This analysis revealed a main effect of both the
n-1 trial [F(1, 23) ¼ 14.57, p , .001], and the
n-2 trial [F(1, 23) ¼ 10.36, p ¼ .004]. That is,
when participants have just avoided an obstacle,
response on the next reach (n-1 effect), or the
second reach (n-2 effect), are higher than if the pre-
vious trials had not contained an obstacle. There
was no signiﬁcant interaction between n-1 and
n-2 [F(1, 23) ¼ 2.39, ns]. Figure 2 also illustrates
the results of planned comparisons between con-
ditions. These comparisons compared the baseline
No–No–No condition with O–No–No showing
the n-2 effect to be signiﬁcant [t ¼ 2.127,
p , .05], and No–No–No compared to No–O–
No showing that the n-1 effect was signiﬁcant
[t ¼ 2.522, p , .02].
Discussion
The results conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings of
Jax and Rosenbaum (2007) and van der
Wel, Fleckenstein, Jax, and Rosenbaum (2007).
The trial after obstacle avoidance is more curved
as measured by the highest point of the reach
trajectory. Although for our aims we did not do
the thorough analysis of Jax and Rosenbaum, we
have shown that prior obstacle avoidance inﬂu-
ences actions two reaches in the future (n-2
effects), as reﬂected by the additive effects in the
O–O–No condition. Therefore this procedure
enables us to examine the effects when two
people undertake alternate trials. We are able to
examine the effects of one person on another
(n-1) as well as examine the effects of an
individual’s own behaviour on their subsequent
reach trajectories (n-2; see Schuch & Tipper,
2007, for similar approaches).
EXPERIMENT 2: SHARED TARGET,
SEATED OPPOSITE, SAME HANDS
This experiment employed a very similar pro-
cedure to that of Experiment 1, except that two
Figure 2. Means of the maximum height reached for non-obstacle
reach trials (trial n), with their standard errors. The bars marked
  show a signiﬁcant t test result. These are one-tailed t tests, as are
those in the following experiments, as they examine a priori
predictions. The bars are labelled with the trial type (n-2, n-1, n),
where “No” represents non-obstacle trials and “O” where an
obstacle was present.
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GRIFFITHS AND TIPPERpeople, seated opposite each other, participated
in the reaching to grasp task. The participants
alternated their reaching actions, such that the
possible priming effects produced by observing




A total of 24 right-handed students (17 female),
with a mean age of 18.9 years, participated
in this study in return for course credits. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Procedure and design
Having established that the Jax and Rosenbaum
(2007) method elicited within-person obstacle
priming effects, we modiﬁed the procedure for
use with two persons. Our participants alternated
reaching and observing while seated opposite
each other. The shared target block was the
same distance away from each person’s reaching
hand, as in Experiment 1 (40 cm). The experi-
menter sat at right angles to the participants.
The obstacle block was placed at the same distance
from each participant’s reaching hand, as in
Experiment 1. That is, the obstacle was 20 cm
from each person’s hand, and each participant
had their own obstacle and never reached over
the other person’s obstacle. See Figure 3, Panel
A for details.
In order for each person to carry out each type
of trial 10 times there were 164 trials per exper-
iment, with a 5-minute break half way through.
Participants alternated reaching and were called
by name at the beginning of each trial. They
were instructed that between trials their eyes
would be closed. On hearing the name of the
person who would act they were told to both
open their eyes. The participant whose turn it
was executed the reach and lift, returned her
hand to the starting position, and then closed
her eyes. The other participant was instructed to
observe the scene, passively watching the other
person’s reach. Each participant carried out 10
practice reaches at the start of the experiment.
Results
As previously described, error trials (e.g., obstacle
collision) were removed from analysis. Furthermore,
where participants failed to open their eyes on an
observation trial their following action trial was
discounted. We removed 0.99% of trials.
Figure 3. Experiments 2–4, seated opposite. Panel A: Experiment
2: shared target, seated opposite, same hands. Black square is the
target; white square is the obstacle. This example shows a No–
O–No trial. Panel B: Experiment 3: shared target, seated
opposite, mirrored hands. This example shows an O–O–No trial.
Panel C: Experiment 4: shared obstacle, seated opposite, same
hands. This example shows an O–O–No trial. Experiments 2
and 3 share the same layout and differ only in hand use.
Experiment 4 uses a narrower table, allowing participants to be
close enough to share the same obstacle and to reach into each
other’s peripersonal space.
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way within-subjects ANOVA for each person’s
results, with two factors: n-1 trial, the effect of
the other person’s reach; and n-2 trial, the effect
of her own movement (each factor being with
and without obstacle). This analysis revealed no
main effects for the within-subject n-2 effect
[F(1, 23) ¼ 2.33, ns], the between-subject n-1
effect [F(1, 23) ¼ 0.64, ns], or the interaction
[F(1, 23) ¼ 0.06, ns]. See Figure 4, Panel A
for the graph of height means. Further analysis
with t tests comparing n-1 (No–O–No) and n-2
(O–No–No) with baseline (No–No–No)
revealed no signiﬁcant effects [t(23) ¼ 0.43 and
t(23) ¼ 0.78, respectively].
Discussion
Somewhat surprisingly, we did not detect any evi-
dence for the idea that the reach trajectory of an
observed person is simulated. That is, there was
no evidence for a participant’s reach to be higher
just after they had observed another person reach
over an obstacle. This lack of obstacle priming
effect between people may be taken as evidence
that indeed action simulation processes are some-
what abstract. Motor systems represent the goal of
the action, in this case grasping the wooden block,
but the speciﬁc manner of the action is not
encoded. Such a result would be in line with pre-
vious work where mirror systems can encode
actions even when they are not directly observed
(e.g., Umilta ` et al., 2001).
A second ﬁnding in this study is that the
person’s own prior reach has no signiﬁcant effect
on their subsequent reach path. That is, n-2
effects are not observed, which suggests that
observation of another person undertaking the
reach-to-grasp task interferes with the represen-
tation of one’s own previous action.
To conﬁrm the lack of reach path priming
effects it was necessary to replicate and extend
these results. Therefore in a follow-on study the
same between-person priming study was under-
taken, except that one participant reached with
the right hand, whilst the other reached with the
left (see Figure 3, Panel B). Previous work by
Koski, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Woods, and Mazziotta
(2003) has shown that inferior frontal mirror
cells respond more when participants imitate as
in a mirror (right hand–left hand) than when
there is anatomical matching (right hand–right
hand), and developmental studies show that early
in life children tend to imitate as in a mirror,
copying another person’s right-hand actions
with their own left hand (e.g., Bekkering,
Wohlschlager, & Gattis, 2000; Wapner &
Cirillo, 1968). Therefore this “mirror” condition
may result in greater compatibility between
observed and produced actions in that they were
both presented in the same visual ﬁeld, as com-
pared to the opposite visual ﬁelds in Experiment
2 (compare Panels A and B in Figure 3).
Figure 4. Means of the maximum height reached for non-obstacle
reach trials (n), with their standard errors, for Experiments 2–4.
The bars indicated by   show a signiﬁcant t test result at p , .01.
The bars are labelled with the trial type (n-2, n-1, n), where
“No” represents non-obstacle trials and “O” where an obstacle was
present.
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A total of 24 right-handed students (18 female),
with a mean age of 20.2 years, participated in
this study in return for course credits. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure and design
This experiment is the same as Experiment 2
except that one of the participants in each pair
used their left hand, while the other used their
right hand, so that the participants mirrored each
other (see Figure 3, Panel B).
Results
In this experiment 1.72% of trials were removed.
As in Experiment 2 there were no signiﬁcant
main effects [n-1: F(1, 23) ¼ 2.10, ns; n-2:
F(1, 23) ¼ 0.42, ns] or interactions [F(1, 23) ¼
0.07, ns]. Neither the participants’ own previous
actions (n-2) nor the observed actions (n-1)
affected their current action (see Figure 4, Panel
B). Further comparison between O–No–No and
No–O–No and the baseline condition, No–
No–No, gave no signiﬁcant result [t(23) ¼ 0.49
and t(23) ¼ 1.39, respectively]. To increase
power, the data from Experiments 2 and 3 were
combined. This conﬁrmed the lack of n-1 [F(1,
47) ¼ 0.19, ns], and n-2 [F(1, 47) ¼ 1.68, ns],
effects and any interaction [F(1, 47) ¼ 0.13, ns].
Discussion
This experiment replicated the results of
Experiment 2 and seems to provide evidence
that, as might be the case with the monkey
mirror neuron system, the reach trajectory by
which a target is approached is not encoded.
However, it is necessary to be cautious in general-
izing the results from any given set of experiments,
and concluding that observed reach trajectories are
never encoded might be premature. Certainly
under the conditions described in these two exper-
iments trajectory is not encoded, and the fact that
in both experiments the person’s own carry-over
effect (n-2) also disappeared gave concern. This
lack of own reach priming is discussed further in
the General Discussion.
We thus sought to design an experiment in
which the participants might engage more in the
experiment and feel that the actions of the other
person are more relevant to them. Note that in
Experiments 2 and 3 during action observation
the other person’s obstacle was 54 cm (near
edge) from the reaching hand and approximately
74 cm from the trunk of the observer. This
resulted in the observed obstacle being just
outside comfortable action (peripersonal) space
for our participants. That is, without further
actions such as leaning forward and raising the
upper body, a reach action could not be achieved.
Certainly, a reach over the other person’s 18-cm-
tall obstacle was not possible.
Therefore we hypothesized that perhaps the
observation of avoidance of an obstacle outside
peripersonal space, on which the participant
could not act, might have made the action less
relevant. This lack of relevance could have pre-
vented the activation of simulation processes.
Previous research has indeed shown that during
selective reaching tasks, the distance of an irrele-
vant to-be-ignored distractor object from the
reaching hand was critical for the obtained
interference and priming effects. For example,
Tipper et al. (1997; Tipper et al., 1992) revealed
action-centred selection processes in a selective
reaching task. That is, when reaching for a
target, distractors closer to the hand produced
signiﬁcantly higher interference and negative
priming.
Clear evidence for the existence of separate
coding of peripersonal space comes from studies
of neuronal activity in monkeys. Two areas
involved in processing information in peripersonal
space are the ventral intraparietal sulcus (VIP;
Colby, Duhamel, & Goldberg, 1993; Duhamel,
Colby, & Goldberg, 1998; Graziano & Gross,
1994) and the ventral premotor cortex, F4
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Gross, 1994) with the VIP having projections to
F4 (Luppino, Murata, Govoni, & Matelli, 1999).
F4 itself has projections to the primary motor
cortex (Barbas & Pandya, 1987; Graziano &
Gross, 1998). Therefore there is clearly a
network in place in monkeys that speciﬁcally pro-
cesses peripersonal space and allows this infor-
mation to inﬂuence action.
That the brain makes a distinction between
peripersonal and extrapersonal space in humans
has been part of a number of theories. Previc
(1998), for example, has proposed distinct cortical
networks dealing with near and far space. He
proposes that the dorsal visual pathway is involved
with peripersonal space and actions carried out
within it, whereas the ventral processing stream
is concerned with extraperipersonal or far space.
Similarly, the results of imaging studies by
Weiss and colleagues (Weiss et al., 2000; Weiss,
Marshall, Zilles, & Fink, 2003) support the
differential involvement of these two streams.
That near and far space might be dissociable is
further indicated by the patients of Vuilleumier,
Valenza, Mayer, Reverdin, and Landis (1998)
and Halligan and Marshall (1991), the former
having a patient who suffered from lateral
neglect in far but not near peripersonal space,
and the latter showing neglect for peripersonal
near but not far space.
The fundamental importance of object dis-
tance for action is clear. That speciﬁc neural
systems are dedicated to encoding peripersonal
space, which enable immediate reach-to-grasp
actions, while other systems encode objects in
far space that require other motor processes
(e.g., walking) before action can be produced,
m a k e ss e n s ei nt e r m so fc o m p u t a t i o n a le f ﬁ c i e n c y .
It therefore remains a reasonable hypothesis that
simulation processes of observed action may also
be inﬂuenced by the distinction between periper-
sonal and far space. Therefore in Experiment 4
we replicated Experiments 2 and 3, but crucially,
when observing obstacle avoidance the obstacle
was within the peripersonal space of the obser-







A total of 24 right-handed students (18 female),
with a mean age of 23.2 years, participated in
this study in return for course credits. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure and design
Both participants used their right hands and sat
opposite each other. Unlike the previous two
experiments, participants shared the obstacle,
which remained 20 cm from their reaching hand.
Therefore the obstacle was now in the peripersonal
space of both the participants. In this new task the
participants now reached for separate target
objects, which were 40 cm from their reaching
hand (see Figure 3, Panel C), with the other’s
target now 5 cm from their hand.
Results
We removed 1.20% of trials due to collision with
the obstacle or failed recording.
Unlike the previous two experiments, this
experiment showed a signiﬁcant main effect for
the inﬂuence of the other participants’ action on
their current reach [n-1: F(1, 23) ¼ 14.983,
p , .01], showing that the priming effect,
previously only observed within a participant’s
own previous actions, had transferred between
people. Interestingly, also in contrast to
Experiments 2 and 3, observing an action does
not remove the effect of a person’s own previous
reach [n-2: F(1, 23) ¼ 13.259, p , .01]
(see Figure 4, Panel C). These two effects,
within and between people, appear to be indepen-
dent, and no interaction was found [F(1,
23) ¼ 1.21, ns]. Further planned contrast t tests
revealed that reaches in each of the obstacle
conditions (n-2 and n-1) were signiﬁcantly
higher (p , .01) than the baseline condition
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No–O–No,t(23) ¼ 2.86].
In addition to the analysis mentioned above we
compared the results from Experiment 4 with
those of the previous two experiments. Comparing
Experiment 4 with Experiment 2 in a mixed two-
way ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant interaction
between experiment and n-1 obstacle priming
[F(1, 46) ¼ 7.193, p , .05], and between exper-
iment and n-2 priming [F(1, 46) ¼ 6.423,
p , .05]. Similarly, contrasts between Experiment
4 with Experiment 3 revealed signiﬁcant inter-
actions between experiment and n-1 obstacle
priming [F(1, 46) ¼ 15.809, p , .01], and
between experiment and n-2 obstacle priming
[F(1, 46) ¼ 4.147, p , .05]. These results further
conﬁrm the distinction between the results of
Experiment 4, where we ﬁnd the obstacle priming
effect, and Experiments 2 and 3, where no
priming effect occurs.
As Experiment 4 is the ﬁrst discovery of reach
path priming between people and to further investi-
gate the nature of the trajectory differences between
Experiments 2 and 4, we carried out further analysis
on several points along the trajectories, in addition
to the comparison of maximum heights previously
described. The Panels in Figure 5 illustrate the
n-2 effect, that is, the comparison between No–
No–No and O–No–No trials (Panels A and B),
and the n-1 effect, that is, No–No–No versus
No–O–No trials (Panels C and D). These ﬁgures
show the qualitative distinction between exper-
iments. The vertical lines show the points of
comparison along the trajectories where we have
carried out analysis in a 2 (obstacle condition)  
location (6 loci at 5-cm steps) ANOVA. For
Experiment 4 there was a signiﬁcant n-2 obstacle
priming effect [F(1, 22) ¼ 19.96, p , .001],
which, as would be expected, interacted with
location [F(1, 22) ¼ 8.99, p , .001], declining as
the hand approached the target. A similar pattern
of effects was observed for n-1 obstacle avoidance
[F(1, 22) ¼ 14.85, p , .001], and interaction with
location [F(1, 22) ¼ 3.63, p , .01]. Conﬁrming
previous ﬁndings, there were no signiﬁcant obstacle
avoidance priming effects in Experiment 2 (all
Fs , 2.01).
Figure 5. Panel A: Experiment 2: shared target, seated opposite,
No–No–No vs. O–No–No trials. Panel B: Experiment 4:
shared obstacle, seated opposite, No–No–No vs. O–No–No
trials. Panel C: Experiment 2: shared target, seated opposite,
No–No–No vs. No–O–No trials. Panel D: Experiment 4:
shared obstacle, seated opposite, No–No–No vs. No–O–No
trials. The trajectories shown are the aggregate of each
participant’s average reach in that condition. The last 5 cm of the
reach path have been removed due to the amount of noise at the
end of the reach as participants adjust their hand for grasping.
The vertical lines mark the points of the curve used in the
ANOVA analysis described in the results section of Experiment
4. The far left of the curve was not analysed due to missing data
from some participants from the early part of their reaches.
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For the ﬁrst time we have shown that observing
another person’s actions appears to evoke simu-
lations of the reach path of the hand. Thus, after
observing another person reach over an obstacle,
the observer’s subsequent reach is higher. Such
an effect implies that prior activation of a reach
simulation remains active, or can be retrieved
from memory, to affect a subsequent reach.
Importantly, we have identiﬁed a critical
boundary condition to such a reach trajectory simu-
lation effect. That is, the contrasting data between
Experiments 2 and 3 and Experiment 4 support
our proposal that reach path simulation only takes
place when objects are within peripersonal action
space. We also ran a control experiment to
conﬁrm that the obstacle avoidance priming
effects were indeed produced by observing another
person’s reach and not just due to the presence of
the objects. In a new version of Experiment 4 a
single participant was required to reach for targets
only on alternate trials and to merely look at the
display on the other trials. That is, participants
were asked to merely look at the n-1 display and
then undertake the next reach trial (n). In this situ-
ationthesameobjectswereviewed on n-1trials,but
there was no other person making a reach. We
found no hint of an obstacle avoidance priming
effect, conﬁrming that it is the observation of
another person’s action that mediates the effect.
However, note that there are other contrasts
between Experiments 2 and 3 and Experiment 4
that could inﬂuence when reach simulation pro-
cesses are activated. For example, in Experiments
2 and 3 where no simulation/priming effects
were observed, participants reached towards and
grasped the same target, while they avoided
completely different obstacles. In contrast, in
Experiment 4 where reach simulation effects were
observed, participants shared an obstacle, but
reached to completely different targets. Although
we have no a priori reasons for predicting that
these circumstances could mediate our contrasting
effects, we needed to investigate more formally
the roles of sharing a target as compared to
sharing an obstacle.
Therefore in Experiments 5a and 5b we
developed a new task to examine three issues:
First, in these experiments the obstacle was
always within the action/peripersonal space of
both participants, and hence we hoped to replicate
reach simulation/priming effects. Second, in
Experiment 5a both participants reach over the
same obstacle while responding to different
targets. This is similar to the procedure of
Experiment 4 and hence should replicate those
reach simulation/priming effects. In contrast,
Experiment 5b required participants to reach to
the same target while avoiding different obstacles.
This procedure is similar to that of Experiments 2
and 3. If we observe reach simulation/priming in
this latter condition, the prior results cannot be
explained by whether or not obstacles are shared.
Third, we examined a new interpersonal spatial
layout in this experiment. Rather than two
people sitting opposite each other, they were
oriented 908 (see Figure 6, Panels A and B). We
predicted that reach simulation processes were
not constrained by speciﬁc viewpoints of other
people, and effects would be detected in this
new design.
Figure 6. Seated at 908. Panel A: Experiment 5a: shared obstacle,
seated at 908. Panel B: Experiment 5b: shared target, seated at 908.
In Experiment 5a participants avoided the same obstacle. In
Experiment 5b participants grasped the same target. Black square
is the target; white square is the obstacle.
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OBSTACLE, SEATED AT 908 8 8 8 8
Method
Participants
A total of 24 right-handed students (17 female),
with a mean age of 21.63 years, participated in
this study in return for course credits. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure and design
Both participants used their right hands. They
were seated at 908 to each other on two sides of
a table. They both shared the obstacle, which
was 20 cm from each of them. They responded
to separate targets, which were 40 cm from the
reaching hand (see Figure 6, Panel A).
Results
We removed 0.68% of obstacle collision and failed
recording trials.
Results are shown in Figure 7, Panel A. As with
the previous experiment signiﬁcant main effects
were found for the inﬂuence of the other partici-
pant on the reach [n-1: F(1, 23) ¼ 9.086,
p , .01] and of an individual’s previous reach
[n-2: F(1, 23) ¼ 7.402, p , .05], again with no
signiﬁcant interaction [F(1, 23) ¼ 4.05, ns].
Further planned contrast t tests revealed that
reaches in each of the obstacle conditions were
signiﬁcantly higher (p , .01) than those in the
baseline condition (No–No–No) [that is, O–
No–No, t(23) ¼ 3.37; No–O–No, t(23) ¼ 3.53].
Discussion
This experiment replicated Experiment 4,
showing again that reaches within peripersonal
space, with a shared obstacle, are encoded. It
additionally shows that our results are not view
dependent and generalize to other perspectives.
It is an important companion experiment to the
following Experiment 5b, which investigated the
effect of shared targets.
EXPERIMENT 5B: SHARED TARGET,
SEATED AT 908 8 8 8 8
Method
Participants
A total of 24 right-handed students (16 female),
with a mean age of 21.00 years, participated
in this study in return for course credits. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Procedure and design
Both participants used their right hands. They
were seated at 908 to each other on two sides of
a table. They both shared the target object,
which was 40 cm from each of their hands.
Their separate obstacles were 20 cm from their
reaching hands (see Figure 6, Panel B). The
other person’s obstacle was 42 cm from their
hand and was within peripersonal reach space.
Figure 7. Means of the maximum height reached for non-obstacle
reach trials (n), with their standard errors, for Experiments 5a
and 5b. The bars indicated by   show a signiﬁcant t test result at
p , .01; þ represents a p value , .05. The bars are labelled
with the trial type (n-2, n-1, n), where “No” represents
non-obstacle trials and “O” where an obstacle was present.
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We removed 0.57% of obstacle collision and failed
recording trials.
This experiment showed signiﬁcant main
effects for the inﬂuence of the other participant’s
reach [n-1: F(1, 23) ¼ 8.549, p , .01] and of
the individual’s previous reach [n-2: F(1,
23) ¼ 46.026, p , .001] (see Figure 7, Panel B).
There was no interaction between these two
factors [F(1, 23) ¼ 0.13, ns]. Further planned
contrast t tests revealed that reaches in each of
the key obstacle conditions were signiﬁcantly
higher than those in the baseline condition (No–
No–No) [that is, O–No–No, t(23) ¼ 3.76,
p , .01; No–O–No, t(23) ¼ 1.85, p , .05].
Discussion
This result further extends and clariﬁes the
circumstances under which observation of action
primes the trajectory of a person’s future actions,
showing that in addition to occurring when
participants avoid the same shared obstacle it can
also occur when the participants are sharing a
target object, and an obstacle is not shared. This
demonstrates that the lack of signiﬁcant results
from Experiments 2 and 3 did not occur because
the participants shared the target rather than
obstacle, but it lends weight to our argument
that the factor inﬂuencing whether or not
priming occurs is in fact whether or not observed
action takes place in the peripersonal space of the
viewer. In Experiment 5a the observed obstacle
was 20 cm, and in Experiment 5b it was 42 cm,
from the observer’s reaching hand, both within
action space.
EXPERIMENT 6: SEATED
ADJACENT, NO OBJECTS SHARED
So far our experiments have all involved the
sharing of either the target or obstacle blocks.
Humans posses the capability of joint action to
achieve goals; this has been demonstrated in
various settings (see Sebanz, Bekkering, &
Knoblich, 2006, for a review). It is a plausible
assumption that simulation of another’s action
may be tempered by how involved the participant
feels in the other’s action, and thus simulation
might be limited to those scenarios in which
objects as well as space are directly shared.
To investigate whether such a limitation was
the case we designed Experiment 6. This task is
represented in Figure 8, Panel A. Participants
were adjacent to each other facing in the same
direction. Each participant reached for their own
target presented directly in front of them and
also reached over their own obstacle. In essence
each person was now undertaking their own
individual reaching task, while the other person’s
reaches were to objects that were irrelevant.
Importantly, although the other person’s obstacle
was irrelevant and never near the observer’s reach
path, it was within 40 cm of the observer’s hand,
so within peripersonal reaching space.
Figure 8. Seated adjacent. Panel A: Experiment 6: seated adjacent,
no objects shared. Panel B: Experiment 7: seated adjacent,
transparent Perspex barrier. In Experiments 6 and 7 neither the
target nor the obstacle is shared by the participants, and they
reach to different locations. The black square is the target; the
white square is the obstacle. Importantly in Experiment 6 the
other person’s obstacle was within reaching peripersonal space of
the observer. In Experiment 7 the obstacle was visually within
peripersonal space; however, the Perspex barrier (the dark grey
vertical line), prevented the participants from being able to
actually reach to the other’s obstacle. The barrier was 50 cm high
and 55 cm long. It extended over the edge of the table between
the participants by 5 cm.
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Participants
A total of 24 right-handed students (17 female),
with a mean age of 18.9 years, participated in
this study in return for course credits. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure and design
In this experiment participants sat adjacent to each
other. They both used their right hands and did
not share each other’s blocks. As in the previous
experiments the obstacle when present was 20
cm from their hand, and the target block was 40
cm. The other participant’s obstacle was 40 cm
away from their reaching hand.
Results
We removed 1.62% of obstacle collision and failed
recording trials.
The results from this experiment replicate and
extend the results from Experiments 4, 5a, and
5b. Again there was a signiﬁcant effect of own pre-
vious movements [n-2: F(1, 23) ¼ 6.55; p , .05]
and of the other person’s movements [n-1:
F(1, 23) ¼ 8.43; p , .01] on the current reach
trajectory (see Figure 9, Panel A). Again there
was no signiﬁcant interaction [F(1, 23) ¼ 0.15,
ns]. Further planned contrast t tests revealed that
reaches in each of the obstacle conditions (n-2
and n-1) were signiﬁcantly (p , .01) higher than
those in the baseline condition (No–No–No)
[that is, O–No–No, t(23) ¼ 2.37; No–O–No,
t(23) ¼ 2.38].
Discussion
Here we show that it is not necessary for there to
be joint action on shared objects in order for
priming to occur, merely that the actions of the
other person take place in peripersonal space.
Furthermore, the viewpoint of observed actions
has been changed again, revealing that these
reach path priming effects are robust in a range





In the ﬁnal experiment we examined further
properties of the peripersonal action priming
effects: ﬁrst, whether they were determined by
the geometrical distance of the obstacle to the
participant’s hand and, second, whether they
were determined by the object’s potential for
action. The approach is based on our previous
studies of selective reaching (Meegan & Tipper,
1999; Tipper, Meegan, & Howard 2002).
1
We had previously demonstrated that when
reaching for target keys to be depressed, irrelevant
Figure 9. Means of the maximum height reached for non-obstacle
reach trials, with their standard errors, for Experiments 6 and
7. The bars indicated by   show a signiﬁcant t test result at
p , .01. The bars are labelled with the trial type (n-2, n-1, n),
where “No” represents non-obstacle trials and “O” where an
obstacle was present.
1 We thank Paul Downing for reminding us of this approach.
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response to the target and were associated with
inhibition, as measured via negative priming
effects (e.g., Tipper et al., 1992).
These distractor interference and negative
priming effects were hand centred, in that they
were larger when the distractors were closer to
the participant’s reaching hand. We argued that
such hand-centred effects were due to the near dis-
tractor winning the race for the control of action.
This race model predicted that if we could slow
down response encoding of the distractor, while
maintaining the same visual information, interfer-
ence and negative priming effects would be
reduced. To this end we presented transparent
obstacles over the distractor object, which made
the key depression response to them, when they
were targets on other trials, more difﬁcult. The
results were very clear. Although the visual proper-
ties of the distractor were held constant, making
the response more difﬁcult with the transparent
obstacle placed over the key greatly reduced how
much the distractor interfered, and it abolished
the inhibition associated with it.
Therefore we replicated Experiment 6, but now
presented a transparent Perspex barrier between
the two participants (see Figure 8, Panel B). If it
is simply the metric distance of the obstacle to
the participant’s hand that determines whether
simulation of reach path is evoked, then we
should see similar action priming to that observed
in Experiment 6. However, following the ﬁndings
of Meegan and Tipper (1999) and Tipper et al.
(2002), we predicted that even though the other
person’s reach over an obstacle could be clearly
seen, because it was not a potential obstacle for
the viewing participant, it would not be simulated




A total of 24 right-handed students (14 female),
with a mean age of 24.4 years, took part in this
study in return for course credits. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure and design
The seating arrangement and block placement in
this experiment were identical to those of
Experiment 6, with participants seated adjacent
to each other. However, in this experiment partici-
pants were separated from each other by a clear
Perspex screen (see Figure 8, Panel B). The
screen was 50 cm high and 55 cm long. The
screen extended from the table, between the par-
ticipants, by 5 cm. The screen was 5 cm from the
blocks of the participant seated on the left side.
Results
We removed 1.24% of obstacle collision and failed
recording trials.
The results from this experiment replicate and
extend the results from Experiments 4, 5a, 5b,
and 6. Again there was a signiﬁcant effect of
own previous movements [n-2: F(1, 23) ¼ 8.09;
p , .01] and of the other person’s movements
[n-1: F(1, 23) ¼ 4.987; p , .05] on the current
reach trajectory (see Figure 9, Panel B).
Furthermore there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between n-2 and n-1 [F(1, 23) ¼ 4.38, p , .05],
revealing that obstacle priming effects were more
potent for n-2. Further planned contrast t tests
revealed that reaches in each of the key n-2
and n-1 obstacle conditions were signiﬁcantly
(p , .01) higher than those for the baseline con-
dition (No–No–No) [that is, O–No–No, t(23) ¼
4.59; No–O–No, t(23) ¼ 3.46].
Discussion
This experiment tested two alternative accounts of
the between-person obstacle priming effect. In
one, the metric distance of the obstacle from the
participant’s responding hand was computed, and
if this was perceived to be within peripersonal
action distance, simulation of the other person’s
obstacle avoidance processes was activated. The
alternative hypothesis was that the potential for
action was encoded. Thus, although the obstacle
avoidance of the other person’s reach could easily
be seen through the transparent barrier, because
the obstacle could not be directly acted upon by
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activated.
As noted above, our expectation was that the
latter account would be supported. When
viewing the other person’s reach over an obstacle
through a barrier, simulation would not take
place, and hence no n-1 reach path priming
effects would be detected. Clearly this was not
conﬁrmed, as signiﬁcant n-1 obstacle priming
was detected. Thus after observing through a
transparent barrier a person reach over an obstacle,
the participant’s subsequent reach was higher.
This result contrasts with our previous work
(Meegan & Tipper, 1999; Tipper et al., 2002).
However, we note that in the previous studies
the obstacle was placed over the target, so it did
not inﬂuence much of the reach path, but affected
the ﬁnal adjustment of the hand as it depressed the
target key. In contrast, in the current study the
obstacle was placed midway between the hand
and target and inﬂuenced the reach aspect of the
prehension system. These different ﬁndings
perhaps reveal a further contrast between reach
and the ﬁnal stages of action such as grasp and
key depression. Certainly the present results of
Experiment 7 support the notion that the simu-
lation of another person’s obstacle avoidance
reach path is determined by the metric distance
of the obstacle from the observers’ hand, and not
higher level factors such as the potential for action.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous studies of mirror systems in monkey
and humans have found evidence for the simu-
lations of another individual’s actions. This work
has shown that a particular object–effector inter-
action is encoded in the understanding of the
goals that another individual is attempting to
achieve. This form of action simulation does not
appear to consider the speciﬁc forms of the
action, as simulation can take place even when
the action cannot be directly seen, or is only
heard. However, the current studies have provided
evidence that in addition to encoding and simulat-
ing goal-orientated actions, the means by which
the goal is achieved is also simulated. We have
shown that viewing another person avoiding an
obstacle primes the following actions of the obser-
ver, such that their own reach trajectory deviates
more strongly as a consequence.
Our experiments have shown that the reach
simulation/priming effects are quite general,
occurring in a number of different scenarios:
Thus they generalize across a range of different
interpersonal viewpoints (e.g., allocentric in
Experiment 4 and egocentric in Experiments 6
and 7); they appear to be independent of
whether the participants jointly act on the same
objects (Experiments 4, 5a, and 5b) or share no
objects (Experiments 6 and 7); and, perhaps
most surprisingly, simulation of another’s obstacle
avoidance takes place when it is viewed through a
transparent barrier (Experiment 7). However, the
key determining factor in our experiments
appears to be the distance between the obstacle
and the viewer’s acting hand. When the obstacle
was beyond the comfortable reach space of the
observer (Experiments 2 and 3), no simulation of
the reach path appeared to take place.
At the time of submitting this article for publi-
cation we were not aware of any investigations that
had examined the possibility that monkey mirror
neuron activity may be mediated by whether or
not certain actions take place in peripersonal
space. However, since submitting our article we
recently became aware of the work of Caggiano,
Fogassi, Rizzolatti, Their, and Casile (2009).
They demonstrated that mirror cells in monkey
F5 can be sensitive to the location of grasped
objects. That is, when viewing another individual
grasp an object, some cells only respond when
the object is within peripersonal reach space,
while others respond only when it is in far extra-
personal space.
However, two contrasts between Caggiano
et al. (2009) and our current data are of note.
First, although some mirror cells are encoding
the distance of the object, the overall population
of mirror cells is not restricted to only peripersonal
space, many respond to far space, and indeed the
majority of cells are unaffected by object distance.
In contrast, our study of reach trajectory suggests
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role, where reach path is only simulated when
observed obstacles are in peripersonal space.
Second, in a study similar to our Experiment 7,
F5 mirror cells appear to compute the potential
for action, where peripersonal cells no longer
respond when viewing an object in peripersonal
space through a transparent surface; whereas we
found viewing obstacle avoidance reaches
through a transparent surface had no effect on
reach path simulation.
To account for apparently discrepant results, we
hypothesize that whether or not observed actions
are within peripersonal space is critical for the
speciﬁc kinematic properties of the reach, but it
may not always be so important for more general
action goals. That is, priming effects examining
achievement of general goals, such as whether a
hand or foot response was observed, whether a
peanut or apple was grasped, whether the object
is visible or occluded, or whether the action is
viewed or only heard, are not necessarily deter-
mined by the distance of the object from the
viewer. Thus the simulations are of the general be-
havioural goals, where speciﬁc microdetails of the
action are of less relevance. In contrast, speciﬁc
effects of how a hand negotiates its way around
an obstacle are far more detailed, and these are
only simulated when relevant objects are within
peripersonal action space.
As discussed, if observing a particular reach
path primes the participant’s own reach trajectory,
then the details of the actual observed reach
trajectories must be encoded. Whilst our study
can give no indication as to where in the brain
these trajectories are simulated, one can speculate
that these observed actions are most likely being
encoded in the same areas that encode one’s own
reach trajectory. Such areas implicated in one’s
own reaches, and which would most plausibly
respond to observation of that action, include the
inferior frontal gyrus, which Hamilton and
Grafton (2007) have identiﬁed as being involved
in the encoding of kinematics (in humans at
least). Single unit recording studies in the
macaque have identiﬁed a region in the intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS), the parietal reach region
(PRR), which includes the medial intraparietal
sulcus (MIP; e.g. Batista & Anderson, 2001).
There is still speculation concerning where the
human homologue of this region might be, and
candidates include the medial occipito-parietal
junction and the medial intraparietal sulcus
(Culham & Kanwisher, 2001; Culham & Valyear,
2006).Of particular note, the superiorparieto-occi-
pital cortex (SPOC) selectively computes whether
objects are within peripersonal action space (e.g.,
Culham, Gallivan, Cavina-Pratesi, & Quinlan,
2008), and encoding within this region is likely to
be key to evoking the simulation of obstacle avoid-
ance reach path.
It is also noteworthy that our obstacle avoidance
priming effects are implicit. That is, participants
were not required to make decisions about the
other person’s actions. Rather they were required
to simply undertake their own reach to target
task, while not making any judgements about the
other person’s actions. Such automatic encoding
would seem to be necessary for coherent inter-
personal behaviour. When interacting with others
during everyday encounters a person rarely has to
explicitly focus on the speciﬁc detailed forms of
another person’s individual reach-to-grasp actions.
Rather,suchprocessesareundertakenautomatically
to facilitate interpersonal interactions, enabling the
limited capacity of conscious awareness to be
focused on other task demands.
In contrast, many of the fMRI studies men-
tioned above often require more explicit encoding
of actions, as when judging the weight of a box
requires attention to be focused on how the box is
lifted (e.g., Hamilton, Joyce, Flanagan, Frith, &
Wolpert, 2007) or participants are asked to
imagine themselves imitating the viewed action
(e.g., Lestou, Pollick, & Kourtzi, 2008). In sharp
contrast, our behavioural priming effects are
implicit, in that the action of the other person is
irrelevant to a participant’s task. Whether the
same neural systems mediate both implicit and
explicit action simulation processes is an open issue.
Finally, a further interesting result from our
study was the observation that in Experiments 2
and 3, in addition to the lack of priming by the
observation of the other’s action (n-1),
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longer occurred. That is, a person’s previous
actions no longer affected their current action.
This is surprising in the light of Jax and
Rosenbaum’s (2007) study, which showed that
the reach trajectory priming effect carried over a
number of trials, and in light of the robustness of
this within-person (n-2) effect in all of our other
experiments.
We speculate that the maintenance and retrieval
of prior reach trajectories is undertaken while
relevant to the ongoing task. However, when a
participant observes a reach over an obstacle that
is outside their peripersonal space, and hence is
never an object they have to reach over, retrieval
of prior reach programmes is vetoed. That is, as
Jax and Rosenbaum (2007) note, producing a
reach that is more curved than is necessary is
costly, but this is usually outweighed by speeded
processing when prior reach programmes can be
reaccessed, rather than computing new reaches on
each trial. However, when those prior (observed)
reaches are irrelevant to a participant’s actions,
because they are outside action space it is more
efﬁcient to recompute a reach on each trial rather
than retrieve irrelevant actions from memory.
Admittedly these are speculations to account for
this unexpected ﬁnding, and future work is necess-
ary to provide a stronger explanation.
In sum, our visuomotor systems have evolved to
cope with complex environments. A central
problem is directing action to relevant objects in
the presence of irrelevant objects that compete
for the control of action. In particular, the avoid-
ance of objects is of fundamental importance,
and constant collisions would become extremely
costly (Graziano & Cooke, 2006). Thus the retrie-
val of previous motor programmes containing
obstacle avoidance routines would be an efﬁcient
means of selectively guiding behaviour. Our
current data suggest that even the mere obser-
vation of another person avoiding an obstacle can
activate corresponding motor representations
and facilitate a person’s own obstacle avoidance
behaviour by evoking more curved reaches. That
these reach path effects are only evoked when
the obstacle in the observed action is within the
peripersonal space of the viewer suggests that
such reach priming is only engaged when of
relevance.
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PERIPERSONAL REACH PATH SIMULATIONAPPENDIX
Mean heights (mm) for trials with an obstacle
Experiment No–No–O O–No–O No–O–O O–O–O
Experiment 1 Single person reaching 307.59 308.82 309.20 312.15
Experiment 2 Shared target, seated opposite, same hands 318.11 325.79 322.59 323.65
Experiment 3 Shared target, seated opposite, mirrored
hands
325.51 326.60 323.37 325.93
Experiment 4 Shared obstacle, seated opposite 314.58 315.77 312.64 315.93
Experiment 5a Shared obstacle, seated at 908 312.74 318.56 313.73 317.03
Experiment 5b Shared target, seated at 908 320.52 325.03 322.11 328.07
Experiment 6 Seated adjacent, no objects shared 317.38 317.22 316.66 319.82
Experiment 7 Seated adjacent, transparent Perspex barrier 336.16 336.82 337.48 338.72
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